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If a narratological book such as Monika Fludernik’s Towards a ‘Natural’ 
Narratology claims to move “beyond formal narratology into the realm of 
pragmatics, reception theory and constructivism” (xi), what kind of outcome can we 
expect? If the reader is familiar with the narratological modus operandi, she will not 
be expecting any kind of empirical data about actual readers. As Marie-Laure Ryan 
notes (474, 476), a cognitive narratologist will willingly undergo a considerable 
theoretical and methodological ordeal just to avoid having to deal with real readers. 
I find this to be a remarkable confession coming from one of the eminent pioneers 
of cognitive narratology. This does not need to be a problem, however. In fact, 
narratologists’ uneasiness about dealing with the reader in the reading process can 
be aggravated to such a pitch as to produce really great theorizing, and this, I think, 
is the case with Natural Narratology. Fludernik claims to be in search of the 
“organic frames of reading,” but the reader position constructed in her theory is 
synthetic through and through. In the following, I argue that this methodological 
unnaturalness within Natural Narratology is not a shortcoming but a productive 
innovation that makes it one of the cornerstones of postclassical narratology.  
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The Problem with the “Reader” in Cognitive Narratology 
After having performed an ingenious reading of Joyce’s “Eveline,” Seymour 
Chatman notes, rather self-critically, that “this laborious and unnatural way of 
reading is not, of course, what the reader actually does but only a suggestion of 
what his logic of decision must be like” (206; cf. Jahn 464). And yet, it is precisely 
through this unnatural reader construct that structuralist narratology was able to 
generate theoretical models that offer a nuanced understanding of the interpretive 
processes involving the reader and the text. Another example of such wonderfully 
burdensome reader constructs is the one erected by Menakhem Perry in his analysis 
of the literary dynamics of Faulkner’s “A Rose for Emily”: for him, the reader is 
ultimately a “metonymic characterization of the text” (43) — and the same could be 
said of Jonathan Culler’s “competent reader” (113–30) or of Umberto Eco’s (1979) 
“model reader.”  
It is this constructed reader of classical narratology, ultimately reducible to a 
“set of [literary] conventions” (cf. Culler 118), that cognitive narratology seems 
determined to get rid of. Manfred Jahn, an eminent pioneer of cognitive narratology 
alongside Fludernik and Ryan, states that classical narratological analyses, with 
their bottom-up approach to narrative phenomena, do not produce results that would 
be informative or even compatible with existing theories of cognitive processing 
(465). But we might just as well turn the question around and ask whether the 
cognitive sciences have introduced any revolutionary findings that would alter the 
way we, as literary scholars, understand the process of reading literary narratives. 
Marie-Laure Ryan’s answer is: “No.” As Ryan notes, “current techniques of brain 
imaging have not yet reached the necessary precision to tell narratologists 
something truly new and interesting concerning the cognitive foundations of 
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narrative” (472). Furthermore, Ryan demonstrates convincingly how cognitive-
narratological reasoning, in order to avoid the interpretive robustness of 
experimental psychology, erects a constructed “model reader” quite similar to the 
one posited by Iser’s phenomenology of reading (481; see also Mäkelä 2012).  
Second-wave cognitive narratologists (e.g., Kukkonen; Caracciolo) 
acknowledge this legacy of phenomenology while still feeling compelled to state 
reasons for not doing empirical research on readers. Marco Caracciolo’s enactivist 
study on experientiality includes a whole subchapter titled “Why This Book Is Not 
an Empirical Study” (11–16): “all my argument needs is that a story could impact 
readers in the way I describe, even if this effect cannot be generalized across all 
readers” (13). Despite Caracciolo’s well-grounded reservations vis-à-vis the 
universality of his own arguments, it is precisely the general reader that he is after 
(see also Jahn 463), not a particularly informed or competent one.1 Is this reader, 
although thoroughly embodied, immersion-prone, and affectively responsive, 
someone who does not care much about literary conventions?  
Jan Alber, among others, has effectively transported the familiarity and 
economy principles of cognitive literary studies to the realm of Unnatural 
Narratology and the study of literary texts that feature physically or logically 
impossible scenarios. The result is a jumpy version of the “emotional” cognitivist 
reader: when brought into contact with the unnatural, such as a postmodernist text 
with incompatible storylines, she is overcome with “discomfort, fear, or worry”—
feelings that she is able to leave behind, however, with the help of appropriate 
cognitive schemata (Alber 83). Then again, if you asked the “competent” reader, 
many of the “unnatural” narrative features analyzed by Alber would be 
postmodernist stock conventions, well established decades ago. So all in all, the 
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cognitivist reader, unlike her structuralist big sister, is a languid “general reader” 
who always opts for the primary, the plausible, the coherent, and the unambiguous; 
and in case of failure, she lapses into catatonia.  
 
Fludernik’s Reader: Between Diachronism and Constructivism  
This critical, and somewhat caricature-like, sketch of the cognitive-narratological 
reader construct brings me, finally, to an appraisal of Fludernik’s uniquely 
productive reader construct in Natural Narratology. Admittedly, Natural 
Narratology also bears traces of the cognitivist reader construct looking for an easy 
way out. I find it mildly surprising that even though Fludernik does great work in 
bringing up different potential meanings of the “Natural” (10–19), one connotation 
she does not mention is “easy, primary, unreflected.”2 Yet one alternative title for 
the book could have been “Towards an Easy Narratology,” because the 
foregrounding of the universalist, embodied everyday frames of sense-making 
necessarily replaces attentiveness to the specific features of an individual narrative 
with the reader’s unreflective doxa. The theory itself is anything but easy, but the 
interpretive default settings it attributes to its reader construct are totally accessible.   
Nevertheless, there is definitely something more to Fludernik’s reader; the 
exceptionality of her reader construct in the field of cognitive narratology is the 
result of the diachronic scope and logic of her argument. To be more precise, 
Fludernik’s reader construct emerges from an irresolvable tension between 
diachronism and constructivism. There seem to be two temporal dimensions of this 
reader: first, the allegedly synchronic process of narrativization whereby the reader 
applies cognitive frames on four different levels of embodied and cultural 
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knowledge; and second, the diachronic process whereby the reader is posited to be a 
time-traveler in literary history.   
For Fludernik, not only the synchronic process of sense-making but also the 
diachronic movement toward ever more literary and complicated frames is a 
process of narrativization. The well-known definition of synchronic narrativization 
in Fludernik’s book (“making something a narrative by the sheer act of imposing 
narrativity on it,” 34) is followed by a much less cited note on diachronization as a 
process: 
 
Besides being a synchronic feature, narrativization can, however, also be 
extended to the diachronic realm. In the long history of narrative forms and 
modes one can observe extensions of existing genres, particularly on the 
basis of familiar cognitive parameters and frames. This applies to the 
complex process of transcoding oral into written narratives . . . and equally 
concerns the establishment of more modern types of narration such as 
second-person fiction. . . . Narrativization can therefore ultimately feed into 
diachronic change, in the incorporation of new options into the realm of 
familiar genres or discourse types. These newly available frames are generic 
and narratological rather than natural categories of a cognitive quality, but 
they are at least partly based on cognitive parameters, which they utilize to 
produce new combinations and new insights. Narrativization thus constitutes 
a processual boundary between the reader and the text, and between the text 
and its historicization. (34–35) 
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Frames “familiar” to whom? Frames “newly available” from whose perspective? 
Like any other cognitive-narratological theory, Natural Narratology purports to shift 
the narratological emphasis from textual structures to the process of reading, but the 
theory is not explicit about its methodological relation to the reader. Then again, 
hardly any narratological theory is. Natural Narratology, however, is such a 
complex system that perhaps agency within this theory can only be emergent. When 
reading Fludernik’s book, I cannot help but wonder: Whose diachronic process is 
this, anyway? Who is the agent in Fludernik’s theory? The theory itself is so 
synthetic that it cannot reflect any organic human process. Explicitly, the theory 
seems to foreground historical authors as the decisive agents who, for example, 
struggle to reshape the conventions of oral storytelling to accommodate written 
textual environments (as in “the complex process of transcoding oral into written 
narratives” in the above quotation). Yet sometimes the agent seems to be the 
autonomous literary text that the Russian formalists once championed (as in “which 
they utilize to produce new combinations and new insights”). In any event, a truly 
cognitive reading of the theory should foreground the agency of the reader. If we do 
that with Natural Narratology, I think we begin to grasp the ingenious dialectics of 
synchronicity and diachronicity in Fludernik’s theory.  
Fludernik’s diachronic method implies a conceptual reader-figure trained by 
the texts she encounters while making her way, in diachronic succession, from the 
oral to the written, or from realism to modernism. Along the way, she acquires the 
requisite reading strategies and cognitive parameters, consequently being able to 
make narrative sense of — to narrativize — (almost) any representation. Finally, 
she ends up facing the postmodernist deconstruction of language and narrative, 
quite as scared and worried as her “unnatural” counterpart, because the tools of 
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narrativization she has gathered in her time-travels do not work on this avant-garde 
material.  
The crucial as well as paradoxical difference between the reader construct of 
Natural and Unnatural Narratology is that only Fludernik’s reader is obviously 
“unnatural” — anti-mimetic (Alber et al. 2010: 115) or non-natural (Fludernik 11) 
in the sense of not pertaining to any imaginable actual reading experience or 
reading history — in its methodically diachronic literary Bildung. Fludernik is thus 
able to operationalize the cognitive-theoretical notions of constructivist 
apperception and frame adjustment as the very logic of her argument. What makes 
this all the more interesting is that the “situation” as implied by the theory is 
impossible: no actual reading situation or readerly history could ever reflect it.  
 
Learning with Fludernik: The Synthetic Reader Construct as a Method 
Allow me to end on a personal note. I was once so inspired by this methodological 
setup that I decided to build my doctoral dissertation around it. In my thesis 
(Mäkelä 2011), dealing with consciousness representation in adultery narratives 
from La Princesse de Clèves to the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal, I wanted to avoid 
merely building a diachronic history of narrative techniques. From the point of view 
of narrative theory, doing that would have meant nothing but rehearsing the old 
formalist story about automatization and estrangement. Instead, I wanted to do what 
Monika Fludernik did, that is, construe a constructivist reader position, unnatural in 
its scrupulous diachronicity, beginning with Madame de Clèves and Laclos, then 
turning to Emma Bovary and Edna Pontellier, and only after that addressing 
modernist examples and Monica Lewinsky. The point was to show that, quite like 
the wanton and adulterous heroines of our literary tradition, the reader of fictional 
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minds is corrupted by previous fictional minds, and instead of having access to any 
original emotion, both the reader and the fictional character build their experience 
in the true spirit of constructivism, that is, with the help of literary frames based on 
previous representations of adulterous experience.  
And of course, this is not the way any flesh-and-blood reader would ever 
read (in the words of Chatman, this is a “laborious and unnatural way of reading”). 
But neither for me nor for Fludernik was this diachronic reader construct ever 
supposed to pass for true empiricism or even as a schematized reader response. 
Rather, it is a theoretical construct, a method. It represents the abstract convergence 
point between the necessary synchrony of the readerly application of “natural” 
cognitive parameters and the necessary diachronicity in the constructivist 
accumulation of these frames.  
So this is what I wanted to absorb from Fludernik’s theory, although my true 
aim all along was to demonstrate the ultimate unnaturalness of literary mind-
construction. One of my colleagues, Samuli Hägg, named this method not 
diachronic narratology, but narratological diachrony, which I think captures the 
gist of Fludernik’s logic of argumentation: namely, the fact that such a constructed 
reader position may be the only narratological method with which we can actually 
model the constructivist logic of frame adjustment and frame application in reading. 
This synthetic reader construct renders possible a diachronic narratology that is not 
methodologically reducible to formalist automatization and estrangement.  
Moreover, it is only through this unnatural reader that we can appreciate the 
persistence of natural frames of oral storytelling in the synchronic process of 
narrativization. This is because in the actual diachrony of contemporary natural 
readers’ lives, written textual frames are likely to prevail over oral ones, just as the 
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conventions of viral social media stories may shape our reception of oral and 
literary narratives. This unnatural, theoretically and methodologically conditioned 
mimesis of the reading process is what we need to content ourselves with until such 
time as some narratologist, someday, somewhere, wants to undertake a longitudinal 
study of the changing frames of narrativization on actual readers.  
 
This article was written during a research period in my postdoctoral project “Voice 
as Experience: Life-Storying in Contemporary Media, 2014–2017” (no. 276656), 
funded by the Academy of Finland. 
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1 Comparing rhetorical narratology with cognitive approaches to narrative, Dan Shen points out that the 
latter are geared toward the “generic audience”: they operate “through sharing the same narrative 
conventions as typically embodied by stereotypic assumptions, expectations, frames, scripts, plans, 
schemata or mental models in narrative comprehension” (152 n.8). The former, by contrast, seeks “to 
enter the position of the implied reader or authorial audience so as to investigate the communication 
between the implied author and his/her hypothetical addressee” (15).  
2 The Labovian notions of “naturally occurring” and “spontaneous” that Fludernik relies on refer to the 
context of storytelling rather than to an effortless or automatized processing in narrative 
communication (cf. Fludernik 13–14).  
